Privacy amplification is the task by which two cooperating parties transform a shared weak secret, about which an eavesdropper may have side information, into a uniformly random string uncorrelated from the eavesdropper. Privacy amplification against passive adversaries, where it is assumed that the communication is over a public but authenticated channel, can be achieved in the presence of classical as well as quantum side information by a single-message protocol based on strong extractors.
strong randomness extractors, provide an efficient, information-theoretically secure solution for this scenario [BBCM95] , even when the passive adversary's side information about the initial weak secret is a quantum state [RK05] .
Access to an authenticated channel cannot always be guaranteed, as establishing such a channel requires either a shared secret key [Sti94] (which is the task privacy amplification aims to solve in the first place) or computational assumptions. Maurer and Wolf [MW97] were the first to relax this assumption and consider privacy amplification against active adversaries, who may intercept and modify the messages exchanged between Alice and Bob at will. In this scenario the adversary may always force the protocol to abort, and security requires that, conditioned on neither party aborting, the key they produce is uniformly distributed and independent from the adversary's side information.
Maurer and Wolf provide a solution for the case where the shared secret X has min-entropy rate larger than 1 2 (equivalently, the eavesdropper's best a priori probability of guessing X is smaller than 2 −|X|/2 ; see Section 2 for definitions). Subsequent works [RW03, KR09] showed how the task could be performed under weaker requirements on the initial secret; however they required complex interactive protocols with a number of rounds that scales with the security parameter. In 2009 Dodis and Wichs [DW09] proposed the first constant-round protocol, based on a novel cryptographic primitive they called a non-malleable extractor. Although they were unable to provide an efficient construction of this primitive, a line of works in pseudorandomness has very recently led to constructions which, combined with the Dodis-Wichs framework, lead to a two-round protocol for privacy amplification against active adversaries that has minimal requirements on the weak secret and near-optimal entropy loss and communication complexity (see [Coh16c, Li16] and references therein.)
While the aforementioned works provide a satisfactory solution, they only apply to the case of classical adversaries, whose side information about the initial shared secret is restricted to a classical correlated random variable. The essential role that privacy amplification plays in quantum key distribution (indeed, it is in this context that Bennett et al. [BBR88] first introduced the problem), together with the increasing necessity to consider the security of classical cryptography against quantum adversaries (so-called postquantum cryptography) raises the question: can privacy amplification be achieved against active quantum adversaries? And if so, can one obtain protocols that are quantitatively comparable to those proven secure in the classical setting?
Answering the analogue question for the scenario of passive quantum adversaries required substantial work. Quantum information is known to provide an advantage for many information-theoretic problems [DHL + 04, FHS13] , and has been shown to lead to dramatic attacks on certain public-key [Sho99] as well as private-key cryptographic tasks [DFNS13, KLLNP15] . Similarly, certain (admittedly contrived) constructions of classically secure strong extractors have been shown to fail in the presence of quantum side information [GKK + 08], so that quantum-proof security can only be established on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, by now many constructions are known, achieving parameters that come close to optimal [RK05, TSSR11, DPVR12] .
Privacy amplification against active quantum adversaries presents a particularly challenging scenario, involving multiple rounds of interaction and the possibility for the adversary to interfere with each round in a way that depends on its quantum side information. Is it possible to guarantee protection against such attacks?
Our results
The main contribution of this work is to answer the above question in the affirmative. We provide the first proof of security of a privacy amplification protocol against active quantum adversaries. We establish our result by adapting the Dodis-Wichs framework for privacy amplification: we show that provided its main ingredient, the non-malleable extractor, satisfies the appropriate notion of quantum-proof security which we introduce, the Dodis-Wichs protocol remains secure against active quantum adversaries. We then proceed to establish that a certain construction of non-malleable extractors, directly inspired from the framework of [CGL15] , satisfies the required notion of quantum-proof security. Our construction yields a non-malleable extractor, and a privacy amplification protocol, that have parameters comparable to the best known in the classical setting.
As classical non-malleable extractors have found further exciting uses in pseudorandomness [CZ16] on top of their original application to cryptography [DW09] , quantum-proof non-malleable extractors may find many further uses beyond their application to privacy amplification. We discuss our construction in more detail below, before explaining the application to privacy amplification against active quantum adversaries.
Non-malleable extractors
Informally, an extractor is a deterministic procedure Ext that takes as input two independent classical random variables, a source X and a seed Y, and is such that, provided the source has high enough entropy and the seed is uniformly distributed, Ext(X, Y) is (close to) uniformly distributed. Applications to cryptography motivate the study of extractors in the presence of an adversary holding side information E about the source: the assumption is now that X, E may be correlated but are such that the conditional entropy of X, conditioned on E, is large; the desired outcome is that Ext(X, Y) should be uniform and uncorrelated with E. In many applications (including privacy amplification) it is desirable to impose an even stronger requirement, whereby the seed Y is leaked to the adversary: Ext(X, Y) should be uniform conditioned on E and Y, a condition which we may succinctly express as
where U is uniform. Such a function Ext is called a strong extractor.
The ubiquitous use of extractors in pseudorandomness and cryptography requires the consideration of even stronger notions of security, where the adversary is given additional side information about the random variables X and Y. Motivated by privacy amplification against active adversaries (which we discuss in detail below) Dodis and Wichs introduced the notion of a non-malleable extractor nmExt, where the additional information consists in the output Z ′ = nmExt(X, Y ′ ) of the extractor, evaluated on the same source X, but for a different choice of seed Y ′ = Y that may be chosen by the adversary based on Y and its side information E. Thus it is now required that
where U is uniformly distributed, and Y ′ is any random variable such that Y ′ = Y. Here one must be careful how Y ′ is determined -for instance, if Y ′ was allowed to depend on both Y and X then Y ′ could easily encode information about Z, and (1) would be impossible to satisfy. The natural requirement, considered in [DW09] , is that Y ′ is obtained as the outcome of a function T : (Y, E) → Y ′ with no fixed points (i.e. Y ′ = Y for every E = e). We extend this condition to the case of quantum side information E by requiring Y ′ to be produced as the outcome of an arbitrary quantum map T acting on the quantum register holding E and a classical register containing Y, whose output is a Y ′ = Y together with a possibly modified quantum register E ′ that forms the adversary's updated side information. (See Definition 28 for a formal definition.) It is not a priori obvious that non-malleable extractors should exist. Dodis and Wichs gave a probabilistic argument showing their existence with parameters essentially matching those of the best-possible strong extractors. Explicit constructions required much more work, but are now known to simultaneously achieve almost the optimal seed length, output length, and error guarantee.
To the best of our knowledge, the case of quantum side information has not been considered before. When considering quantum side information, existence proofs based on probabilistic arguments no longer apply, so that it is not even clear that quantum-proof non-malleable extractors exist. Even for the simpler task of establishing security of strong extractors against quantum side information, few general techniques are known (see nevertheless [KT08] for the case of one-bit extractors, and [BFS15] for recent results in this direction), so that the task of proving quantum-proof security of a non-malleable extractor may appear daunting at first. Our first main contribution is a proof that a specific classical construction, with very good parameters, is quantum-proof.
Theorem 1.
There exists a universal constant r ≥ 1 such that for any integers n, k and any
Moreover, nmExt can be computed in time poly(n, log(1/ε)).
Our proof closely follows some of the arguments that were used for the construction of non-malleable extractors in the classical setting. In particular, we give a quantum-proof analog of the so-called flip-flop primitive [Coh15] (see Section 3.3) and use it to construct a quantum-proof correlation breaker with advice [CGL15, Coh16b] (see Section 3.4).
The key difficulty in analyzing the flip-flop primitive and the correlation breaker consists in formulating, and manipulating, conditional (in)dependence relations between random variables, a task that is made all the more subtle when considering quantum side information. We find that the formalism of quantum Markov chains, previously employed in the analysis of quantum-proof two-source extractors in [AFPS15] , provides a powerful way to express such relations. For instance, the conditions on the adversary's choice of the modified seed Y ′ expressed above can be succinctly formulated as the requirement that X − E − YY ′ forms a Markov chain such that Y = Y ′ always holds. It is then required that (1) holds, under the additional assumptions that (Y, E) ∼ (U m , E) and that the conditional entropy of X, conditioned on E, is sufficiently large. We refer to Section 3.1 for more on this.
We remark that more recent constructions of classical non-malleable extractors [CL16, Coh16a, Coh16c, Li16] achieve even better parameters than the ones provided in Theorem 1. These constructions rely on improved correlation breakers with advice, which in turn are based on independence-preserving mergers [CS16] . In particular, these constructions do not rely on the flip-flop primitive. We believe it may be possible to extend our approach to show quantum-proof security of these constructions as well; here we made the choice of concentrating on a construction which we believe achieves a good tradeoff in terms of parameter strength versus technical intricacy.
Privacy amplification and the Dodis-Wichs protocol
In this section we turn to give a somewhat more formal introduction to the problem of privacy amplification. Alice and Bob share an n-bit random variable X such that H min (X|E) ≥ k, where E is the adversary's side information. Alice and Bob's ultimate goal is to agree on an m-bit string R that is ε-close to uniform even conditioned on the transcript of their interaction, which is accessible to Eve. Further, in the active setting, Eve is allowed to tamper with the communication to her liking, modifying the messages exchanged by Alice and Bob. (Since Eve may always impersonate either party and thereby completely confuse the other, Alice and Bob are allowed to produce a special "abort" symbol and the security requirement is that the produced key be uniform and uncorrelated with E, conditioned on neither party aborting.) We refer to λ = log(1/ε) as the security parameter of the protocol. The relevant parameters measuring the quality of the protocol as functions of n, λ are its round complexity (number of rounds required by the protocol), entropy loss (amount of min-entropy lost during the protocol, namely, k − m, where m = |R|), communication complexity (total number of bits communicated), and supported min-entropy (least value k for which the protocol is secure). Dodis and Wichs gave a two-round protocol for privacy amplification secure against active adversaries. The main ingredient in their protocol is a non-malleable extractor, which is combined with an informationtheoretically secure message authentication code (MAC) in an ingenious way in order to obtain security (see Figure 3 for a description of the protocol). Our definition of quantum-proof non-malleable extractor is motivated by its use in this protocol, and we show that, with our definition, the Dodis-Wichs proof of security extends to the case of active quantum adversaries. Together with our quantum-proof non-malleable extractor, given by Theorem 1, we obtain the following privacy amplification protocol against active quantum adversaries. Organization. We start with some preliminaries in Section 2, where the main notions pertaining to quantum information and pseudorandomness required for our work are introduced. Section 3 contains our main technical contribution, the quantum-proof security of a construction of correlation breaker with advice. Section 4 describes our quantum-proof non-malleable extractor, and Section 5 explains the application to privacy amplification against active quantum adversaries.
Preliminaries

Notation
We write H for a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, L(H) for the linear operators on H, Pos(H) for positive semidefinite operators, and D(H) ⊂ Pos(H) for positive semidefinite operators of trace 1 (density
, and trace-preserving.
We use capital letters A, B, . . . and X, Y, . . . to designate either classical discrete random variables or quantum states represented by a density matrix. That is, we write X for a random variable distributed on a finite alphabet Σ, with distribution Pr(X = x) = p x , as well as for the density matrix ρ X = ∑ x∈Σ p x |x x|. Similarly, we write E for the reduced density ρ E , so that e.g. (X, E) designates the classical-quantum (cq for short) state ρ XE = ∑ x |x x| ⊗ ρ x E , where here the marginal probability Pr(X = x) = Tr(ρ x E ). It will always be clear from context which letters designate classical random variables and which designate a quantum system. For an integer m, U m denotes a random variable uniformly distributed over m-bit strings.
We write e.g. 
Quantum information
We refer to the textbook [Wil13] for background on quantum information. Here we only recall the notions that will be most directly useful to us. Definition 3. Let ρ XE ∈ D(C 2 n ⊗ H) be a cq state. The min-entropy of X conditioned on E is defined as
When the state ρ with respect to which the entropy is measured is clear from context we simply write
It is often convenient to consider the smooth min-entropy, which is obtained by maximizing the minentropy over all cq states in an ε-neighborhood of ρ XE . The definition of this neighborhood depends on a choice of metric; the canonical choice is the "purified distance". Since this choice will not matter for us we defer to [Tom15] for a precise definition.
where B(ρ XE , ε) is the ball of radius ε around ρ XE , taken with respect to the purified distance.
Dual to the min-entropy is the conditional max-entropy H max (X|E).
Here the only property we will need is that H ε max (X|E) ≤ log |Σ| for any cq state (X, E) such that X ∈ Σ and ε ≥ 0. In addition we will make frequent use of the following chain rule for the smooth conditional min-entropy.
Lemma 5 (Chain rule, [VDTR13]).
There is a universal constant c ≥ 0 such that the following holds. For any ε ′ , ε ′′ > 0 and ε > ε ′ + ε ′′ , for any tripartite state ρ ABC ,
Markov chains provide a convenient formalism to express simple conditional independence relations between random variables, and we will use the following notation extensively. In the definition I(X : Y |E) refers to the quantum condititional mutual information,
, where H denotes the von Neumann entropy.
Definition 6. We say that a tripartite state ρ XEY is a Markov state if I(X : Y |E) = 0. We often write the same condition as the condition that X − E − Y is a quantum Markov chain.
We note that all quantum Markov chains considered in this paper will take the form X − E − Y, where X, Y are classical random variables and E may designate a quantum system. The following proposition provides a structural characterization of such quantum Markov chains.
Proposition 7 (Theorem 6, [HJPW04] 
Extractors
We first recall the definition of a strong quantum-proof extractor. Recall the notation (X,
and U m for a random variable uniformly distributed over m-bit strings.
Definition 8. Let n, d, k, m be integers and ε
Throughout the paper we make use of the following explicit strong quantum-proof extractor.
Theorem 9 ([DPVR12]). For any integers n, m and for any
We will often apply extractors to cq states ρ XE on which we only have a bound on the smooth minentropy, and to seeds that are only close to being uniformly distributed. The following lemma shows how the errors add up in this case.
Lemma 10.
There is a universal constant c > 0 such that the following holds.
Proof sketch. The lemma essentially follows from Lemma 17 in [AFPS15] (which is more general), but our formulation is slightly different; we sketch the argument. Using the decomposition (3) of a Markov state we may write
By monotonicity of the trace distance the condition
Next using the definition of the smooth min-entropy it follows using an argument similar as in the proof of [AFPS15, Lemma 18] that there exists a state σ XYE such that
We then conclude by the definition of a strong extractor.
Message authentication codes
We make use of standard constructions of information-theoretically secure one-time message authentication codes, or MAC. This security notion is defined as follows.
Efficient constructions of MAC satisfying the conditions of Definition 11 are known. The following proposition summarizes some parameters that are achievable using a construction based on polynomial evaluation.
Proposition 12 (Proposition 1 in [KR09] 
Error correcting codes
We recall the standard definition of error correcting codes. 
Quantum-proof correlation breaker with advice
The main ingredient in the construction of the non-malleable extractor to be presented in Section 4.1 is a pseudorandom object called a correlation breaker with advice [CGL15, Coh16b] . Informally, a correlation breaker with advice is a procedure AdvCB : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} ℓ × {0, 1} a → {0, 1} m that takes as input a sample from a source X ∈ {0, 1} n , a seed Z ∈ {0, 1} ℓ and a string α ∈ {0, 1} a which we refer to as the advice string. AdvCB is designed to break correlations in the following sense. For any pair of arbitrarily correlated random variables (Z, Z ′ ) that are jointly independent from a second pair (X, X ′ ) and such that Z is uniformly distributed and X has sufficient min-entropy, and for any advice strings α = α ′ , it holds that
Although breaking correlations between random variables is one of the fundamental problems one encounters in the area of pseudorandomness, correlation breakers were first explicitly considered as an independent "primitive" in [Coh15] , and correlation breakers with advice were first considered implicitly in [CGL16] and then explicitly starting with [Coh16b] . For a detailed discussion we refer to [Coh16a] . The construction presented in this section is a simplified form of the one from [CGL15] . Our main technical contribution is in proving that the latter construction is quantum proof. As a side contribution, we provide a somewhat simpler and more streamlined analysis.
The main conceptual hurdle in extending the analysis from [CGL16] lies in finding the proper framework in which to express the correlations that arise from quantum side information. As explained in the introduction, we find it convenient to work with simple quantum Markov chains, that will typically take the form X − E − Y, where X and Y are classical random variables and E is quantum. As the analysis progresses, additional random variables H = H t , . . . , H 1 will be considered, but these will be such that the condition that X − HE − Y is a quantum Markov chain is preserved. This conditional independence will be essential at all stages of the analysis.
To formalize this in Section 3.1 we describe an extension of the formalism of histories introduced in [Coh15] to the case where quantum side information may be present. In Section 3.2 we recall the notion of hierarchy of independence, a notion which can be traced back, in an implicit form, to [DP07, DW09] . Section 3.3 describes the flip-flop procedure [Coh15] , which forms the main part of the analysis of the correlation breaker with advice. The latter is defined in Section 3.4, where the ingredients from the previous sections are put together.
(L, E, R)-Histories Definition 15. Let L, R be classical random variables and E a quantum system such that L − E − R forms a quantum Markov chain (or Markov chain for short). A sequence of random variables
The following basic lemma shows that histories do not "break" the Markov chain condition.
An immediate corollary is that if
The lemma will be used repeatedly without always mentioning it. Although the proof of the lemma is simple we give a proof sketch as it arguably forms the only point in this paper where the fact that the side information E is quantum needs to acknowledged explicitly; the main tool for this is the characterization of quantum Markov chains from [HJPW04] recalled in Proposition 7.
Proof sketch of Lemma 16. Suppose H = H 1 . Then by definition H 1 is a function of either L or R, and the conclusion trivially holds. More precisely, suppose e.g. H 1 is a function of L; then we can write 
Conditioning on H
where again the Markov condition is verified. If H is longer the proof proceeds similarly via induction.
Hierarchy of independence
A basic building block in the construction of the correlation breaker with advice is a mechanism that breaks correlations between random variables in some weak sense. Informally speaking, the mechanism is composed of a pair of efficiently-computable functions a, b : {0, 1} h × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} b with the following property. For any quantum Markov chain XX ′ − E − YY ′ where Y is uniform and X | E has sufficient entropy, it holds that A ≈ U where A = a(Y, X), and furthermore (B,
In words, the A variable is uniform by itself, and furthermore the B variable is uniform even conditioned on A ′ , A. This notion of independence was coined "hierarchy of independence" [CS16] and its implementation, which is based on alternating extraction, can be traced back to [DP07, DW09] . In the following lemma we show that this implementation is quantum-proof. We proceed with the formal treatment.
For a constant c ≥ 1 to be chosen sufficiently large, and for integers n, ℓ and ε > 0 we set the following parameters:
We further assume that
We make use of the following building blocks:
• Let Ext 1 : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} s → {0, 1} b be the (2b, ε) strong quantum proof extractor that is given by Theorem 9.
• Let Ext 2 : {0, 1} h × {0, 1} b → {0, 1} s be the (2s, ε) strong quantum proof extractor that is given by Theorem 9.
Note that by Theorem 9, Equation (5), and by taking the constant c introduced in (4) large enough, explicit extractors with parameters as stated for Ext 1 and Ext 2 exist. 
Lemma 17 (Hierarchy of independence
and
Proof. Item (i)
Conditioned on Y s , the random variable A is a deterministic function of X only. Similarly, the random variable A ′ is a deterministic function of
. Proceeding similarly as in (i), but now using that by the chain rule (2)
Lemma 10 implies that
To adjoin A ′ note that T − AY ′ s Y s HE − XX ′ is a quantum Markov chain, so we can include X, X ′ in (7) to deduce
HE).
Using that
is a deterministic function of X ′ and Y ′ s we may adjoin it as well, yielding (ii). Finally we note that
Item (iii). The last step is similar. First, using the chain rule (2),
and it follows from (ii) and Lemma 10 that
Adjoining the remaining variables is done exactly as in the proof of (ii). The claim on the entropy loss of X follows from a last application of (2).
The flip-flop procedure
The flip-flop procedure is described in Figure 1 . The procedure takes as input three random variables X ∈ {0, 1} n , Z ∈ {0, 1} ℓ and Y ∈ {0, 1} h , in addition to an "advice bit" α ∈ {0, 1}. It returns a random variable O ∈ {0, 1} h . We write it as
For integers n, ℓ and for ε > 0 let s, b, h be integers as defined in (4). Let X ∈ {0, 1} n , Z ∈ {0, 1} ℓ and Y ∈ {0, 1} h be random variables, and α ∈ {0, 1}, provided as input to the procedure.
Perform the following four steps: To analyze the performance of the procedure we consider two additional random variables Z ′ , Y ′ which may be correlated with Z and Y and a third random variable X ′ which may be correlated with X, but is such that XX ′ − HE − ZZ ′ is a Markov chain for some (XX ′ , E, ZZ ′ )-history H. We also assume that Y (resp. Y ′ ) is a deterministic function of Z and H (resp. Z ′ and H).
(Flop) Define
A = Ext 1 (X, Y s ), T = Ext 2 (Y, A), B = Ext 1 (X, T). 4. (Finale) If α = 0 then let O = Ext 3 (Z, B). If α = 1 then let O = Ext 3 (Z, A). Return FF(X, Z, Y, α) = O.
Given two bits α, α ′ ∈ {0, 1} we define random variables A, T, B, Y, and A, T, B, O, corresponding to an execution of FF(X, Z, Y, α) (as described in Figure 1), and similarly primed random variables
For the analysis of the flip-flop procedure we distinguish between three separate cases. The first two correspond to α = α ′ . The "bad-then-good" case, corresponding to α = 0, is analyzed in Lemma 18. The "good-then-bad" case, corresponding to α = 1, is analyzed in Lemma 21. Informally speaking, both these cases correspond to a creation of independence. Finally Lemma 24 analyzes the case when α = α ′ , and shows that in this case closeness to uniform, and independence when it exists, are preserved. The three lemma all make the following assumptions:
, 1} h , and α, α ′ ∈ {0, 1}; 2. XX ′ − E − ZZ ′ is a Markov chain, H an (XX ′ , E, ZZ ′ )-history, and Y (resp. Y ′ ) is a deterministic function of Z and H (resp. Z ′ and H);
Lemma 18 (Flip-Flop, Bad-then-Good). Assume (⋆), and suppose (α, α ′ ) = (0, 1). Let
Then H is an (XX ′ , E, ZZ ′ )-history and
Proof. We first analyze the "Flip" part of the procedure.
Claim 19 (Flip, Bad). At the end of the intermission it holds that
where
, HE). By the chain rule (2),
Using that A − Y ′ YHE − ZZ ′ is a quantum Markov chain, by Lemma 10 and the assumption that Ext 3 is a strong quantum-proof extractor we deduce
Conditioned on Y ′ , the random variable B ′ is a function of X ′ only while conditioned on A, Y is a function of Y only, so we may adjoin B ′ to conclude the claim. The bounds on the entropy loss follow directly from the chain rule (2) and the assumption that b, h = Ω(log(1/ε Y )).
Next we turn to the "Flop" part of the procedure.
Claim 20 (Flop, Good). At the end of the finale it holds that
Proof. To prove the claim it will suffice to show that
Indeed once (9) has been proven, the claim will follow directly using Lemma 10 and that Ext 3 is a strong quantum-proof extractor. The bounds on the entropy loss are a direct consequence of the chain rule (2) and the prior bounds from Claim 19.
We now prove (9 
Conditioned on T, the random variable B is a deterministic function of X, while conditioned on The lemma follows.
Lemma 21 (Flip-Flop, Good-then-Bad). Assume (⋆), and suppose (α, α ′ ) = (1, 0). Let
Claim 22 (Flip, Good). At the end of the intermission it holds that
Proof sketch. The proof is analogous to the proof of Claim 20 and so we omit it. The only condition that was really needed is (Y, HE) ≈ (U h , HE), which is guaranteed by the assumptions (⋆) made in Lemma 21 as well as Lemma 18.
Next we turn to the "Flop" part. 
Claim 23 (Flop, Bad). At the end of the finale it holds that
Conditioned on B ′ , the random variable O ′ is a function of Z ′ only, while conditioned on Y, the random variable A is a function of X only, so we may adjoin O ′ to the above to obtain
Conditioned on Y, the random variable A is a function of X only which is independent of Z. Using that Ext 3 is a quantum-proof strong extractor and Lemma 10 the conclusion of the claim follows from (10).
The lemma follows.
Finally we treat the case where the advice bits are identical.
Lemma 24 (Flip-Flop, Same Advice). Assume (⋆), and suppose
Proof sketch. The proof of this lemma is similar (and in fact easier) than that of Lemma 18 and Lemma 21 so we only sketch the argument. The first part of the lemma is clear and follows directly from (i) and (ii) of Lemma 17. Next we prove the second part. The cases α = α ′ = 0 and α = α ′ = 1 are similar; suppose e.g. α = 0. We rely on the following simple claim. 
Proof of Claim 25. By the chain rule (2), H
We can then proceed similarly and propagate the independence condition to obtain the same conclusion for Y and Y ′ , then A and A ′ , (T, T ′ ), (B, B ′ ) and finally (O, O ′ ). The claims on the entropy loss follow from the chain rule (2).
Let n, a be integers and let ε > 0. Let s, b, h be the integers defined in (4) where we set ℓ = cah for some large enough constant c. Note that this choice of ℓ meets the required conditions on s, b, h, ℓ as stated in (5). Set k X = cab, m = k X /4.
Let Ext 4 : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} h → {0, 1} m be the (2m, ε) quantum-proof extractor that is given by Theorem 9. By (4), h was chosen sufficiently large as required by Theorem 9.
Let X ∈ {0, 1} n , Z ∈ {0, 1} ℓ be random variables, and α ∈ {0, 1} a a fixed string, provided as input to the procedure.
Perform the following steps:
1. Set Y 0 to be the length h prefix of Z. 
For
i = 1, . . . , a define Y i = FF(X, Z, Y i−1 , α i ). 3. Define O = Ext 4 (X, Y a ). Return AdvCB(X, Z, α) = O.
Quantum-proof correlation breaker with advice
Our quantum-proof correlation breaker with advice is described in Figure 2 . The following theorem states its guarantees.
Theorem 26. Let X, X ′ ∈ {0, 1} n and Z, Z ′ ∈ {0, 1} ℓ be such that XX ′ − E − ZZ ′ is a quantum Markov chain, and let H be an (XX ′ , E, ZZ ′ ) history. Let b, h, s, a and ε > 0 be parameters of the procedure AdvCB defined in Figure 2 . Let k X be an integer and
Proof. Let g ∈ [a] be the least integer such that α g = α ′ g . By a repeated application of Lemma 24, there exists an
By Lemma 18 and Lemma 21,
for some η 2 = O(η 1 ) and
Once the key condition (11) has been established it only remains to verify that the condition propagates through the remaining rounds (with controllable loss in error and entropy), irrespective of whether the advice strings α, α ′ are identical or differ. For this we apply Lemma 18, Lemma 21, or Lemma 24, depending on the scenario; note that the conclusions of the first two lemmas are stronger than what is needed here. Thus, application of the appropriate sequence of these lemmas allows us to conclude that there exists an (1/η 3 ) ) when taking the constant c in (4) large enough. Hence, using that Ext 4 is a strong quantum-proof extractor
The proof then follows by noting that one can adjoin Z, Z ′ and then remove the excess random variables.
Quantum-proof non-malleable extractor
In this section we present our explicit construction of quantum-proof non-malleable extractors, for which we introduce a formal definition in Section 4.1. The construction combines the correlation breaker with advice described in Section 3 with an additional procedure called an advice generator, described in Section 4.2. The final construction combines these ingredients following a general framework [CGL16] ; we present this in Section 4.3.
Quantum-proof non-malleable extractors
We generalize the notion of non-malleable extractor introduced in [DW09] to the setting of quantum side information. Our definition is motivated by the use of non-malleable extractors to achieve privacy amplification, as discussed in Section 5. We first extend the notion that the adversary may query the extractor on any different seed Y ′ than the seed Y actually used to the case where Y ′ may be generated from Y as well as quantum side information held by the adversary.
Definition 27. Let d be an integer and H a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. We say that a CPTP map
where Eq. (12) in Definition 28 requires that the seed Y is uniformly distributed and independent from (X, E). We note that our construction satisfies a stronger condition where the conclusion holds even if it is only required that Y is uniformly distributed and X − E − Y is a Markov chain.
Advice generator
Given integers n, d and ε > 0, we define a function AdvGen : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} a , where a = a(n, d, ε), which we call an advice generator. To this end we make use of the following building blocks. Let d, d 1 ≤ d, m, k and ε 0 be parameters of the procedure, q a prime power, and F q the finite field with q elements.
• Let ECC : F d q → F m q be an error correcting code with relative-distance 1 − γ. We identify {0, 1} d with the corresponding subset of F d q .
• Let Ext 0 : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d 1 → {0, 1} log m be a (k, ε 0 ) strong quantum-proof extractor. We identify the output of Ext 0 with an element of {1, . . . , m}.
Set a = d 1 + ⌊log q⌋ and define
where y 1 is the length d 1 prefix of the d-bit string y. In (13), by ECC(y) Ext 0 (x,y 1 ) we mean the following: interpret Ext 0 (x, y 1 ) as an index i ∈ {1, . . . , m}; ECC(y) Ext 0 (x,y 1 ) then stands for the i-th entry in the codeword ECC(y), interpreted as a log(q)-bit string. 
Proposition 29. Suppose X, Y and Y
Proof. We first verify (i). Note that I, I ′ are deterministic functions of Y 1 , Y ′ 1 , respectively, and of X. Second, G, G ′ are deterministic functions of I, I ′ , which precede G, G ′ in H, and of Y, Y ′ . Thus, H is indeed an (X, E, YY ′ ) history. Item (i) then follows by Lemma 16. Items (iii) and (iv) follow directly from the chain rule, the length of G, G ′ , and the output length of Ext 0 .
Finally we need to show (ii), i.e. that Pr(
Consider any possible fixing of the variables Y 1 , Y ′ 1 to strings y 1 , y ′ 1 respectively. Clearly, if y 1 = y ′ 1 then G = G ′ , and so we may assume that y 1 = y ′ 1 , in which case I = I ′ (with probability 1). As ECC has relative distance 1 − γ, for a uniformly random index i ∈ {1, . . . , m} the probability that ECC(Y) i = ECC(Y ′ ) i is bounded above by O(γ). Using that Ext 0 is a (k, ε 0 ) strong quantum-proof extractor, except with probability
Thus at the cost of aggregating √ ε 0 to the total error, we may consider only y 1 that satisfy (14). Together with the error O(γ) from ECC, this completes the proof. Let X ∈ {0, 1} n and Y ∈ {0, 1} d be random variables. Perform the following steps:
2. Let Y 2 be the length-d 2 prefix of Y, and set T = Ext 5 (X, Y 2 ). 
The construction
The final construction of our non-malleable extractor combines the advice generator AdvGen from Section 4.2 with the correlation breaker with advice AdvCB from Section 3.4. It is described in Figure 3 .
that X − E − YY ′ is a quantum Markov chain. For the remainder of the proof all quantities are evaluated on the state σ.
By Corollary 30 applied with δ as defined in Figure 3 , there exists an (X, E, YY ′ ) history H 1 that contains G, G ′ such that
By the data-processing inequality followed by the chain rule (2),
Recall that T = Ext 5 (X, Y 2 ). As X − H 1 E − Y 2 is a quantum Markov chain and Ext 5 a strong quantum-proof extractor, Claim 32 implies that (T, Figure 3 is chosen large enough. 
One can easily verify that the hypothesis of Theorem 26 in the above application is met by taking d ≥ log r (n/ε) for a large enough constant r. 
, which concludes the proof.
Privacy amplification
In this section we show that the framework for constructing privacy amplification protocols introduced by Dodis and Wichs [DW09] is secure against active quantum adversaries, provided it is instantiated with a quantum-proof non-malleable extractor nmExt as defined in Section 4.1, and a quantum-proof strong extractor Ext. The protocol is described in Figure 4 ; we call it Protocol DW.
Before defining the properties of correctness, privacy and security of the protocol we formalize the class of active attacks for the adversary that we consider. Intuitively, the adversary has the following control over the outcome of the protocol. First, it may possess initial quantum side information E about the weak secret X shared by Alice and Bob. That is, it has a choice of a cq source ρ XE , under the condition that H min (X|E) is sufficiently large. Second, the adversary may intercept and modify any of the messages exchanged. In Protocol DW there are only two messages exchanged, Y A from Alice to Bob and (Y B , σ) from Bob to Alice. To each of these messages the adversary may apply an arbitrary transformation, that may depend on its side information E. We model the two possible attacks, one for each message, as CPTP maps
Protocol DW
, where H denotes the Hilbert space associated with system E. Note that we may always assume that H is large enough for the adversary to keep a local copy of the messages it sees, if it so desires. More formally, we define an active attack for the adversary as follows.
Definition 33. An active attack on Protocol DW is specified by We require that the protocol satisfies the following three properties:
• (Correctness) If both T 1 and T 2 are the identity map then Bob reaches the KEYDERIVED state, Alice reaches the KEYCONFIRMED state, and R A = R B with probability 1.
• (Key Privacy) (R B , V, E) ≈ ε (U m , V, E).
• (Key Authenticity) Pr(R A / ∈ {R B , ⊥}) ≤ ε. Before giving the proof of the theorem we discuss a typical setting of parameters. In the context of quantum key distribution it will typically be the case that the initial min-entropy H min (X|E) can be assumed to be linear, H min (X|E) ≥ αn for some α > 0. In this case we may achieve security ε = 2 −cn for some small enough c > 0 by instantiating Ext using the strong quantum-proof extractor from Theorem 9 with a linear seed length and nmExt using the quantum-proof non-malleable extractor from Theorem 31, again with linear seed length. This will result in a protocol with linear communication and exponentially small security that produces a shared key of length 1 4 H min (X|E). In other settings H min (X|E) may only be polylogarithmic in n. In this case for any ε = poly −1 (n) we can use a strong quantum-proof extractor and a non-malleable extractor with polylogarithmic seed length, resulting in a protocol with polylogarithmic communication and inverse polynomial security that produces a shared key of length We first observe that since the only random variable in V correlated with X is σ, which has length t, it follows from Lemma 5 that H ε Ext min (X|VE) ≥ k − t − c log(1/ε Ext ) for some constant c > 0. We may then use Lemma 10, together with the assumption that Ext is a strong quantum-proof extractor, to conclude that (R B , V, E) ≈ ε (U m , V, E), as long as ε is such that ε = O(ε Ext ). This establishes the property of key privacy.
Let 
